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Abstract: This manuscript presents a novel mechanism (at the physical layer) for authentication
and transmitter identification in a body-centric nanoscale communication system operating in the
terahertz (THz) band. The unique characteristics of the propagation medium in the THz band
renders the existing techniques (say for impersonation detection in cellular networks) not applicable.
In this work, we considered a body-centric network with multiple on-body nano-senor nodes (of
which some nano-sensors have been compromised) who communicate their sensed data to a nearby
gateway node. We proposed to protect the transmissions on the link between the legitimate nano-
sensor nodes and the gateway by exploiting the path loss of the THz propagation medium as the
fingerprint/feature of the sender node to carry out authentication at the gateway. Specifically, we
proposed a two-step hypothesis testing mechanism at the gateway to counter the impersonation
(false data injection) attacks by malicious nano-sensors. To this end, we computed the path loss
of the THz link under consideration using the high-resolution transmission molecular absorption
(HITRAN) database. Furthermore, to refine the outcome of the two-step hypothesis testing device,
we modeled the impersonation attack detection problem as a hidden Markov model (HMM), which
was then solved by the classical Viterbi algorithm. As a bye-product of the authentication problem,
we performed transmitter identification (when the two-step hypothesis testing device decides no
impersonation) using (i) the maximum likelihood (ML) method and (ii) the Gaussian mixture model
(GMM), whose parameters are learned via the expectation–maximization algorithm. Our simulation
results showed that the two error probabilities (missed detection and false alarm) were decreasing
functions of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Specifically, at an SNR of 10 dB with a pre-specified
false alarm rate of 0.2, the probability of correct detection was almost one. We further noticed that
the HMM method outperformed the two-step hypothesis testing method at low SNRs (e.g., a 10%
increase in accuracy was recorded at SNR = −5 dB), as expected. Finally, it was observed that the
GMM method was useful when the ground truths (the true path loss values for all the legitimate
THz links) were noisy.
Keywords: body-centric sensor networks; nanoscale communication; terahertz communication; nano
sensors; security; authentication; outlier detection; sensor networks; healthcare systems
1. Introduction
Nanoscale communication systems have attracted researchers due to their promising
applications in healthcare, manufacturing industries, environmental control, etc. [1]. On
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the other hand, body-centric communication has potential applications in healthcare,
entertainment, etc. [2]. Generally, body-centric communication is classified as “off”-, “on”-,
and “in”-body communication based on the communication among implanted or wearable
electronic devices. In this work, we focused on the body-centric communication systems
where nano sensors/devices operating in the THz band are deployed on the body of a
human being.
Due to the small size of nano devices, the existing frameworks, techniques, and
methods proposed for communication networks such as WiFi, 4G, etc., are not suitable
for exchanging information amongst the nano devices [3]. For instance, nano devices
are unable to operate at microwave bands due to their small size. They would require
molecular communication and the terahertz (THz) band for operation. Additionally, in IoT
devices, due to the small energy sources, the computational processing capability is limited.
Therefore, it is necessary to meet the requirements for new protocols of nano devices at
all layers of the protocol stack. Operating in the THz band (0.1–10 THz) is a promising
solution at the physical layer (PL) [4], which makes the antenna size very small and thus
suitable for exchanging information between nano devices.
Like other communication networks, the body-centric nanoscale communication net-
works are also prone to a wide range of active and passive attacks by adversaries [5]. Some
of the common attacks include eavesdropping, impersonation, denial of service (DoS), etc.
Here, we investigated an impersonation attack in body-centric nanoscale communication
networks. Figure 1 shows an illustration of an impersonation attack on a smart healthcare
system scenario. The nano nodes are deployed on the body of a person/patient for disease
diagnostics or to remotely monitor his/her health parameters. These nano devices are
connected to a wearable device, which communicates the data to an outdoor network via
a nano-to-micro interface. Assuming an enemy of the person secretly deployed its own
nano machines nearby with the aim of impersonating the person’s legitimate nodes to
report false measurements to the remote health unit, an incorrect response through the
nano machines or nearby doctors could result in devastating consequences. Therefore, we
need an authentication mechanism at the nano-to-micro interface device (wearable device)
to allow data transmission (reported measurements, i.e., glucose, blood pressure, etc., of










Figure 1. An envisioned future body-centric nanoscale healthcare system with possible mali-
cious nodes.
In traditional communication systems, the countermeasures for such attacks are
performed at the higher layer using cryptography. Despite the wide work in the field of
cryptography, the mechanism can be compromised because of its sole dependency on the
predefined shared secret among the legitimate users. With recent advances in quantum
computing, traditional encryption has become vulnerable to being easily decoded, and
Sensors 2021, 21, 3534 3 of 14
existing crypto-based measures are not quantum secure unless the size of secret keys
increases to impractical lengths [6]. In this regard, physical layer (PL) security finds itself as
a promising mechanism in future communication systems. PL security exploits the random
nature of the physical medium/layer for security purposes [7].
Authentication is one of the pillars required for the security of any communication
system. PL authentication is a systematic procedure that uses PL’s features to provide
authentication. In conventional systems, asymmetric key encryption (AKE) is typically used
in the authentication phase, which is the realm of public key encryption (a crypto-based
approach). Such schemes are quantum insecure and incur overhead or high computations,
which not only increase the size of the device, but also consume much power. The devices
fabricated for nanoscale communication are energy constrained as they incorporate a small
source of energy (a battery). PL authentication has a low overhead (a simple procedure
that typically includes feature estimation and testing) and is almost impossible to clone
unless the devices lie on each other. Various fingerprints including RSS [8], CIR [9,10],
CFR [11,12], carrier frequency offset [13], and I/Q imbalance [14] have been reported for
PL authentication in conventional communication systems.
Related Work: The authors in [15] for the first time studied authentication using path
loss (S21 parameter) in body-centric communication using millimeter waves. Regarding
the security of systems operating in the THz band, we found some works [5,16–18] in
the literature. The work [16] provided the first study on the security challenges faced by
nanoscale communication systems, while the work [17] presented some possible promising
applications along with the security challenges in the Internet of Nano-Things. Further,
the experimental work of Jianjun et al. [5] for the first time rejected the claim about security
in the THz band. The claim was that the inherit narrow beamwidth of the THz link makes
it secure and thus impossible for a malicious node to accomplish an eavesdropping attack.
The authors in [5] in their experiments used reflectors of different shapes between the
THz transmitter and receiver. Then, with the help of secrecy capacity and blockage as
performance metrics, they clearly demonstrated that eavesdropping attacks in the THz
band can be easily performed.
The differences between our work and previous work are as follows: The first
work [15], which studied the authentication problem in body-centric communication
systems, considered millimeter-wave communication with a three-node setup. In contrast,
our work considered multiple legitimate and malicious nodes operating in the THz band.
The work [5] considered an eavesdropping attack in a system operating in the THz band,
which was a different problem/attack than the attack we considered in our work. Next, in
our previous work [18], we studied PL authentication for an in vivo nanoscale communica-
tion system whereby we utilized the path loss as the device fingerprint for a three-node
system (i.e., Alice, Eve, and Bob). The difference between our previous work [18] and this
work was twofold. First, the previous work was limited to the three-node system only,
while in this work, the system model was comprised of multiple legitimate and malicious
nodes. Second, the previous work was for an in vivo nanoscale communication system
where authentication occurs at a nano node (Bob).
Contributions: For the first time, this work studied authentication at a nano-to-micro
interface device (wearable device) in an on-body-centric communication system where we
exploited the high-resolution transmission molecular absorption (HITRAN) database [19]
for computing the path loss. For the first time, impersonation attack detection at the
wearable device/receiver/Bob in multiple legitimate and malicious nano nodes operating
in the THz band is performed via different mechanisms. We performed authentication
by two-step hypothesis testing. We refined the output of the hypothesis testing via the
hidden Markov model (HMM) with the Viterbi algorithm. We also performed transmitter
identification via the maximum likelihood and Gaussian mixture model (GMM) with the
expectation–maximization algorithm.
Outline: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the system
model. Section 3 discusses authentication via two-step hypothesis testing. Section 4
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presents the hidden Markov model to refine the output of hypothesis testing. Section 5
provides transmitter identification schemes. Section 6 presents simulation results with
discussions, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. System Model
For the purposes of the simulation, we considered a square 2D map/layout of size
(1 m ×1 m) where M + N nano transmission (Tx) nodes, M Alice (legitimate) nodes {Ai}Mi=1,
and N Eve (malicious) nodes {Ej}Nj=1 are deployed according to the uniform distribution
model, whilst a nano-to-micro interface device/receiver node, Bob, is placed at the origin, as
shown in Figure 2. We assumed that the Tx nodes transmitted with a fixed/pre-specified
transmit power so that the path loss can be computed by Bob.






















Figure 2. System model for the simulation purposes: Bob is placed at the origin. Alice’s and Eve’s
node locations are modeled as uniformly distributed random variables. In this case, M = 10 and
N = 10.
The path loss is given as [20,21]:
L( f , d)[dB] = La( f , d)[dB] + Ls( f , d)[dB], (1)
where f is the frequency, d is the distance, La( f , d)[dB] is the absorption loss, and Ls( f , d)[dB]
is the spreading loss. More details of spreading and absorption losses are given in Appendix A.
In the next section, we discuss the two-step mechanism for impersonation detection.
3. Authentication via Two-Step Hypothesis Testing
We assumed that the shared channel is time-slotted, whilst the transmit nodes perform
channel sensing before transmitting; hence, there are no collisions. Without loss of general-
ity, it can be assumed that Ai is the legitimate node for slot k, but if Ai does not transmit
during this time slot, Ej could transmit to Bob pretending to be an Alice node. Therefore,
Bob needs to authenticate each message received on the shared channel and verify the
transmitter identity (if no impersonation has been declared) in a systematic manner.
Assume that the noisy measurement z(k) = L + n(k) has been obtained at time k (for
instance, by using the pulse-based method as discussed in [22]), where n(k) ∼ N(0, σ2) and
L is the path loss. Furthermore, in line with previous studies [18,23], we assumed that Bob
has already learned the ground truth via prior training on a secure channel. The ground
truth vector can be denoted by l = {L1, ..., LM}T . The two-step hypothesis testing or
maximum likelihood (ML) hypothesis test can be explained by the following equations:
(T∗, i∗) = min
i
|z− Li|. (2)
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Next, the binary hypothesis test works as follows:H0(no impersonation) : T
∗ = min
i
|z(k)− Li| < ε
H1(impersonation) : T∗ = min
i
|z(k)− Li| > ε
. (3)
Equivalently, we have:
T∗ ≷H1H0 ε, (4)
where ε is a small threshold—a design parameter. This work followed the Neyman–
Pearson theorem [24], which states that, for a pre-specified Pf a, ε can be chosen such that
Pmd is minimized.
The error probabilities for the above hypothesis tests are:
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(ccdf) of a standard normal distribution, and π(i) is the prior probability of Ai. Thus,
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where π(j) = ∑Mi=1 αijπ(i) is the prior probability of Ej. 0 < αij < 1 is the fraction of slots
that were originally dedicated to Ai, but were found idle and thus utilized by Ej.
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where we assumed that the unknown path loss Lj ∼ U(Lmin, Lmax) ∀j and ∆ = Lmax− Lmin.
Next, we discuss the HMM for refining the outcomes/results of the two-step hypothe-
sis testing.
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4. Hidden Markov Model-Based Approach
To refine the output of the two-step hypothesis testing, we used the HMM-based
approach. More specifically, at a given time instant k, the system is in one of the two states
with the state-space: S = {s0, s1}. The states s0 and s1 imply that there is no impersonation,
impersonation respectively, at time k. However, the true state of the system is hidden;
therefore, what we observe through the hypothesis test is another observable Markov chain.








where ri,j = Pr(x[k] = i|s[k] = j), i, j ∈ {0, 1}. The off-diagonal elements in the i-th row of
R represents the errors made by the ML test, i.e., deciding the state as s[k] = j, j ∈ {0, 1} \ i
while the system was actually in state s[k] = i.
The transition from state i to state j occurs after a fixed interval of T = tk − tk−1
seconds where 1/T is the measurement rate. Assume that the system was in state s0 at time
k = 0, i.e., x[0] = [1, 0]T , we are in time k− 1 and want to predict the probability vector








where pi,j = P(x[k] = j|x[k− 1] = i), i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Then, we have the following relation:
x[k] = Pkx[0]. Alternatively, we can write: x[k] = Px[k− 1].
ML Estimation of a Hidden Markov Sequence Using the Viterbi Algorithm
The Viterbi algorithm is used for the ML sequence estimation (MLSE) of {s[k]}Kk=1,
given {x[k]}Kk=1 as:
{s[k]} = arg max
{s′ [k]}
p(x[k]|s′ [k]). (11)
At this stage, we are done with impersonation detection mechanisms. Next, we discuss the
transmitter identification mechanisms.
5. Transmitter Identification
The transmitter identification is accomplished via two approaches: ML- and GMM-
based transmitter identification.
5.1. ML-Based Approach
In the ML-based approach, the probability of the misclassification error resulting from




















2 , L̃u,i =
L̃i+L̃i+1
2 . Additionally, l̃ = {L̃1, ..., L̃M} = sort(l) where the sort
operation (.) sorts a vector in increasing order. For the boundary cases, e.g., i = 1, i = M,
L̃l,1 = Lmin, L̃l,M = Lmax, respectively.
5.2. Transmitter Identification Using Gaussian Mixture Modeling
The GMM consisted of Q = M + N component densities where only the Q = M den-
sities could be trained. The 3Q GMM parameter was learned by running the expectation–
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maximization (EM) algorithm on the training data. The GMM, in its standard form, is
perfectly suited for transmitter identification. Under the GMM, the probability density
function (pdf) of the (observed) mixture random variable X is the convex/weighted sum






where each φq(x) is a Gaussian pdf that satisfies: φq(x) ≥ 0,
∫
x∈R φq(x)dx = 1. The
weights/priors satisfy: πq(x) ≥ 0, ∑Qq=1 πq = 1.
The GMM has 3Q unknown parameters, which were learned by applying the iterative
expectation–maximization algorithm on the training data {xm}Mm=1. The posterior probabil-
ity for each point xm in the training data (i.e., the likelihood of xm belonging to component




















































The iterative EM algorithm monotonically increased the objective (likelihood) function
value and converged when the increase in the likelihood function value between two
successive iterations became less than the threshold ε.
Figure 3 shows a flow graph of the proposed methodology. The noisy estimated
measurement/path loss z(k) at slot k was fed to a two-step mechanism for impersonation
detection, and the HMM was used to refine the outcomes of the two-step mechanism with
the help of transition and emission probability matrices (i.e., P and R) and the Viterbi
algorithm. Transmitter identification was done via the ML and GMM approaches when no
impersonation was decided.



























Figure 3. Proposed methodology for impersonation detection and transmitter identification in
body-centric nanoscale communication systems operating in the THz band.
6. Simulations
6.1. Setup
We kept M = N = 10, αij = 0.5 ∀j, f = 1 THz, T = 285 k, and p = 1 atm. Both the
Alice and Eve nodes were deployed according to the uniform distribution in a 1 m × 1 m
area. A total of 105 random realizations (independent of the Alice and Eve nodes) of the
nodes’ deployment were taken, and then, errors were averaged over the realizations.
Pf a and Pmd are two well-known probabilities resulting in hypothesis testing. Pf a was
defined as the probability that any i-th Alice node can be considered as any of the Eve
nodes Pmd is the probability of the event that any j-th Eve node can be considered as any of
the Alice nodes.
6.2. Results
Figure 4 represents the two probabilities against SNR = 1
σ2
where the improvement in
error probabilities with an increasing SNR can be seen clearly. The designed parameter ε
decreased Pmd, but increased Pf a.

































Figure 4. The error probabilities against SNR = 1
σ2
with different values for threshold ε. (a) Probability
of false alarm. (b) Probability of missed detection. Both probabilities are decreasing functions of SNR.
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Figure 5 shows the efficacy of the HMM. At a low SNR, the performance of the HMM
was far better than HT, and at a high SNR, HT was close to the HMM. The results were
produced after the Monte Carlo-based simulation. The total number of transmissions was
kept to 105 (more specifically, 105 binary states (s0, s1) were generated), ε = 1, P = 0.5I2×2,
where I is the identity matrix and K = 103. The errors resulting from the HT and HMM
methods were calculated as the number of times the predicted/estimated state was not
equal to the actual state divided by the total transmissions. The accuracy was then com-
puted accordingly. The entries of R were calculated according to Pf a and Pmd. Figure 6
shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for different configurations of
the nodes and transmissions from Eve nodes (i.e., αij). Typically, the ROC contains two
error probabilities (Pd and Pf a), but due to multiple nodes in this study, we had three
probabilities. For any Pf a value, Pmc was constant, which is obvious from Equation (13).
Increasing the SNR not only improved Pd, but also improved Pmc as well. Pf a was chosen
as an independent variable and swept in the range from zero to one. Using Equation (6),
the threshold was calculated for a given SNR value. Further, Pd = 1− Pmd (the detection
probability) and Pmc were computed as the average after doing 105 uniform realizations of
the nodes’ deployment. We observed that increasing the number of nodes did not affect Pd,
but Pmc increased with an increase in the number of Alice nodes (M). We further observed
that when fewer nodes (Alice nodes) remained idle during their allocated slot, the more Pd
we had.
48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66



















(a) SNR = −5 dB
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76




















(b) SNR = 0 dB
Figure 5. Performance comparison of two-step hypothesis testing and the hidden Markov model
(HMM) with Viterbi algorithm. (a) Histogram comparison for a highly degraded channel, i.e.,
SNR = −5 dB. (b) Histogram comparison for a moderately degraded channel, i.e., SNR = 0 dB.
Performances of both approaches get closer and closer when SNR increases.
Pmc is the probability of deciding the i-th Alice node, as any Alice node without
i. Pmc becomes an important metric when dealing with multiple nodes’ identification.
Here, Pmc resulted from both transmitter identification algorithms (ML, which is a bi-
product of two-step HT-based authentication and the GMM). As the GMM is a learning
approach, it requires training data to learn its parameters. That is the reason that we only
performed transmitter identification using the GMM. We assumed no data were available
for Eve nodes.
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+ SNR = 0 dB
o SNR = 10 dB
 SNR = 20 dB
(b) M = N = 20 αij = 0.5 ∀j
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+ SNR = 0 dB
o SNR = 10 dB
 SNR = 20 dB
(d) M = N = 20 αij = 0.25 ∀j
Figure 6. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves: Three probabilities (false alarm, detection,
and misclassification) are considered in the ROC. To study the impact of nodes, subfigures (a,b) are
plotted. (a) Ten numbers of legitimate and malicious nodes are considered with 0.5 prior probability
for a j-th malicious node. (b) Twenty numbers of legitimate and malicious nodes are considered with
0.5 prior probability for a j-th malicious node. Further, subfigures (c,d) are plotted to see the impact
of transmissions /prior probabilities of malicious nodes. (c) Ten numbers of legitimate and malicious
nodes are considered with 0.25 prior probability for a j-th malicious node. (d) Twenty numbers of
legitimate and malicious nodes are considered with 0.25 prior probability for a j-th malicious node.
Figure 7a was generated by assuming actual ground truths (noiseless (Li ∀i)) of
Alice nodes available for performing ML-based transmitter identification. The ML was
implemented using Equation (2) having noiseless ground truths. Figure 7a shows that
the two approaches performed equally. To test the efficacy of the GMM approach, we
performed another experiment and plotted the results in Figure 7b. This time, we assumed
that the ground truths of the Alice nodes were noisy Li + n ∀i (i.e., when the ground
truths were obtained on a secure channel, it also included noise or an error). This time,
the ML-based approach was implemented using Equation (2) to include noisy ground
truths. The GMM parameters were estimated on 104 training data generated from the
legitimate nodes and then tested on 105. The error was calculated as the number of times
the estimated state was not equal to the actual value divided by the total transmissions
for both approaches and for both cases. We observed from Figure 7b that the overall
performance of GMM was improved. The performance improved even further for lower
SNR or higher σ2.
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(a) Noiseless ground truths












(b) Noisy ground truths
Figure 7. Misclassification error Pmc against estimation error σ2 for two-step hypothesis testing
and GMM. (a) A scenario is considered where the perfect ground truth vector, i.e., l is obtained via a
secure channel. (b) A scenario is considered where acquired ground truths are noisy. GMM has an
advantage over ML when ground truths are noisy.
6.3. Discussions
• From Figures 4 and 6, we learned that the path loss could be exploited as a fingerprint
to carry out authentication in body-centric nanoscale communication systems operat-
ing in the THz band. In other words, the proposed mechanisms can be used as a first
line of defense against impersonation attacks.
• The results of the proposed two-step mechanism can be improved by using an ad-
ditional approach (i.e., HMM). In particular, at a low SNR, the improvement was
quite significant.
• The results in Figures 4 and 6 indicate that, under the impersonation detection prob-
lem, it is not possible to minimize both Pmd and Pf a at the same time because of
their conflicting nature. In other words, one could minimize one error type only by
compromising the other error type.
• GMM (Learning-based scheme) performed the same as our proposed two-step mecha-
nism in transmitter identification. However, we learned that slightly complex nature
of the GMM could produce improvements when the ground truths of legitimate nodes
are noisy.
7. Conclusions
This paper provided an authentication mechanism using path loss as a fingerprint
at the physical layer in body-centric nanoscale communication systems operating in the
terahertz band. The work’s importance was advocated by illustrating envisioned smart
healthcare application of body-centric nanoscale communication systems. The complex
and quantum insecure crypto measures can be complemented using this approach, which
is simple and quantum secure (i.e., no encryption or shared secret key is involved). This
was observed from ROC curves after doing the Monte Carlo-based simulation for nodes’
deployment under a uniform distribution that with a 20% false rate, the detection probabil-
ity was almost one when operating with SNR = 10 dB. For simulation purpose, nodes were
deployed in a 1 m × 1 m area under a uniform distribution, and air was considered as a
medium among the nodes, while the path loss was calculated using the HITRAN database.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
THz Terahertz
HMM Hidden Markov model
GMM Gaussian mixture model
SNR Signal-to-noise ratio
IoT Internet of things
DoS Denial of service
PL Physical layer
AKE Asymmetric key encryption
RSS Received signal strength
CIR Channel impulse response
CFR Channel frequency response
2D Two dimensional
ML Maximum likelihood
CCDF Cumulative complementary distribution function
MLSE Maximum likelihood sequence estimation
EM Expectation maximization
ROC Receiver operating characteristics
HITRAN High-resolution transmission molecular absorption
Appendix A
The spreading loss is given as:




where c is the speed of light. The absorption loss is given as:
La( f , d) =
1
τ( f , d)
, (A2)
where τ represents the transmittance of the signal and is given by the Beer–Lambert law:
τ( f , d) = e−k( f )d, (A3)
where k is the medium absorption coefficient, given as:
k( f ) = ∑
i,g
ki,g( f ), (A4)
where:





Qi,g, σi,g( f ) (A5)
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where i is the isotopologue (a molecule that differs in isotropic composition), g is gas,
p0(T0) is standard pressure (temperature), σi,g( f ) is the absorption cross-section, and Qi,g








where R is the gas constant, NA is the Avogadro constant, and qi,g is the mixing ratio for i
of g. The absorption cross-section can be expressed as:
σi,g = Si,gGi,g( f ), (A7)
where the line intensity Si,g and line shape Gi,g( f ) parameters can be computed using data
from the HITRAN database [19].
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